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Abstract 
The ‘party paradox’ thesis claims that centre-left parties have a genuine interest 
in  pro-shareholder  corporate  governance  reforms,  while  centre-right  parties 
oppose such reforms. Based on case studies of Switzerland, Sweden, and the 
Netherlands, I test the accuracy of this thesis and find that it does not apply to 
either  of  these  cases:  in  Switzerland  pro-shareholder  reforms  were  made 
possible by centre-right not centre-left support; In Sweden and the Netherlands 
pro-shareholder  reforms  were  marginal,  because  a  broad  coalition  uniting 
centre-right and centre-left opposed them. My findings show therefore that the 
‘party  paradox’  is  not  a  universal  phenomenon  and  that  most  micro-level 
explanations of this phenomenon are inaccurate. In order to explain in which 
cases  a  party  paradox  will  emerge,  we  need  to  add  the  nature  of  relations 
between  employees  and  employers  (cooperative  vs.  confrontational)  as  a 
determinant of centre-left preferences. 
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1. Introduction 
Based on assumptions derived from agency theory (Jensen & Meckling 1976), 
most  corporate  governance  theories  see  struggles  over  corporate  governance 
mainly  as  a  conflict  between  insiders  and  outsiders  of  the  company.  They 
consider  that  corporate  insiders  profit  from  ‘agency  costs’  and  are  therefore 
opposed to attempts to increase external control over companies. This reasoning 
is applied not only to managers, but also to employees and their representatives 
in the political arena. Trade unions and social democratic parties are therefore 
expected to oppose shareholder-orientated corporate governance reforms (see 
notably Roe 2003, Pagano & Volpin 2005). 
 
Cioffi and Höpner (2006, 2006a) provide empirical evidence, which contradicts 
this view. They find that political processes of corporate governance reform 
during the 1990s and 2000s have been marked in several countries by a ‘party 
paradox’: while centre-left parties pushed for pro-shareholder reforms, centre-
right parties defended the traditional insider system. They explain this situation 
by the fact that political actors do not perceive corporate governance reforms as 
an  insider-outsider  conflict,  where  employees  and  managers  oppose  outside 
investors, nor as a class conflict where mangers and investors would oppose 
labour,  but  as  a  conflict  over  managerial  control  where  labour  and  outside 
investors share different common interests. Based on their case studies, Cioffi 
and Höpner (2006a: 433) conclude that the ‘natural pre-strategic preferences’ of 
labour  concerning  corporate  governance  reform  is  to  favour,  not  to  oppose, 
shareholder-orientated reform. 
 
One crucial factor, which explains according to Cioffi and Höpner (2006: 488) 
the party paradox, is the fact that labour favour pro-shareholder reforms as a 
means of breaking managerial power that is based on extra-market instruments 
of corporate control. This is indeed a plausible attitude for labour and centre-left 
parties in systems like Germany, Italy, France, and the US, where the corporate 
governance system was established mainly by the business elite in collaboration 
with centre-right parties and went largely against the interests of labour. This 
argument also implies however, that in countries where labour participated in 
the establishment of the corporate governance system, labour has no incentive to 
favour pro-shareholder reform. In such countries, we would hence expect the 
political coalitions over corporate governance issues to be different from the 
ones identified by Cioffi and Höpner (2006). 
 
More collaborative relations between labour and employers and between centre-
left and centre-right parties prevail especially in small, corporatist countries (see 
Katzenstein 1985).   2
Based on case studies of Switzerland, Sweden, and the Netherlands, I find that 
only one of the three countries – Switzerland – shows at some point a ‘party 
paradox’, while in the two other cases the ‘insider – outsider’ opposition seems 
to prevail. Conversely, Switzerland contradicts the ‘party paradox thesis’ in that 
a considerable part of centre-right parties supported pro-shareholder reforms. 
 
Given that most of the explanatory factors that Cioffi and Höpner (2006) single 
out for the ‘party paradox’ are present in all three cases analyzed here, I argue 
that only the nature of the relations that exist between employers and employees 
and the historical role that the left played in the emergence of the corporate 
governance system allow us to explain labour preferences in all cases. 
 
The paper is structured as follows: after the discussion of theories of the politics 
of corporate governance reform and a brief methodological note, I describe the 
recent  reform  processes  of  corporate  governance  in  each  one  of  the  three 
countries. I then compare the determinants of centre-left and centre-right actors 
put forward by Cioffi and Höpner with the evidence from the three cases. A 
final part concludes. 
 
2. The ‘Party Paradox’ of Finance Capitalism 
Roe  (2003)  explains  the  differences  between  insider-orientated  corporate 
governance  regimes,  where  ownership  is  concentrated  and  minority 
shareholders  have  few  legal  protections,  on  the  one  hand,  and  shareholder-
orientated regimes on the other, by the varying strength of social democratic 
parties.  In  ‘social  democracies’  –  that  is,  were  the  left  is  politically  and 
ideologically strong – labour makes credible additional claims on firm assets, 
which pushes blockholders to hold on to their stakes in order to oppose these 
claims. At the political level, Roe (2003: 46) expects a general reluctance of the 
left  to  promote  instruments  of  external  control,  such  as  measures  favouring 
takeovers. This theory implies hence that where social democrats are strong, the 
corporate governance system will be insider-orientated and outsider investors 
will be badly protected. 
 
Cioffi and Höpner’s (2006) findings for the cases of Germany, Italy, France, and 
– to a lesser extent – the US, contradict this account. Rather than an opposition 
between ‘capital’ and labour, the former pushing for reform, the latter opposing 
it, they find that shareholder-orientated corporate governance reforms during the 
1990s were mainly supported by centre-left parties, while centre-right parties 
opposed them. 
 
This situation is counterintuitive since an increase in the shareholder-orientation 
of a company leads to a redistribution of value added in favour of shareholders   3
notably  to  the  disadvantage  of  employees  (Deakin  &  Slinger  1997,  de  Jong 
1997).  A  coalition  between  workers  and  minority  shareholders  favouring 
increasing external market control over the company appears hence paradoxical. 
 
Cioffi  and  Höpner  (2006:  477-478)  explain  centre-left  support  for  pro-
shareholder reforms by different factors linked to the position of labour within 
the firm: firstly, increasing transparency and management accountability implies 
increasing power for the supervisory board (or for non-executive directors in 
one-tire  board  systems),  which  is  desirable  for  employees  in  systems  where 
supervisory  board  codetermination  exists.  Secondly,  and  related  to  the  first 
point,  like  shareholders,  labour  has  an  interest  in  limiting  agency  costs 
stemming from value-destroying strategies such as ‘empire building’. The most 
prominent argument, however, is that, thirdly, employees become themselves 
increasingly shareholders both directly through private savings and indirectly 
through their pension fund money, which is increasingly invested in shares (see 
for  this  argument  also  Gourevitch  and  Shinn  2005).  Their  preferences  blur 
hence  increasingly  with  those  of  shareholders.  These  factors  led  centre-left 
parties to ally with new financial institutions against their traditional opponents, 
i.e. centre-right parties and their constituency, managers. 
 
These micro-level factors would lead us to predict the emergence of centre-left 
support for corporate governance reforms in the three countries analyzed here as 
well. After all, two of the three countries (Sweden and the Netherlands) know 
some  form  of  co-determination,  employees  have  an  interest  in  limiting 
managerial agency costs in all three countries, and in all three do employees 
have  increasing  parts  of  their  savings  invested  in  shares,  either  directly  as 
private household savings or indirectly through their pension funds. 
 
Yet, beyond these micro-level determinants of labour preferences, Cioffi and 
Höpner (2006: 487-488) also mention a more general factor, which explains in 
their cases why centre-left parties too supported shareholder-orientated reforms. 
This factor is linked to the relations between the economic and the political 
sphere and to political strategy: 
‘[...] the established post-war […] corporate governance regimes were 
largely [...] the creation of the right and they were designed to benefit 
conservative parties, politicians, and their supporters. This led to close 
and  mutually  reinforcing  business-party  relationships  between 
managerial and party elites that persisted over decades and became 
extremely  valuable  politically  and  financially  for  managers  and 
politicians  alike.  [Therefore,]  Corporate  governance  reform  [...] 
provided  the  centre-left  with  a  way  to  attack  the  opaque  and   4
strategically important relationships between conservative politicians 
and corporate managers, while appealing to the resentment of their 
left-wing constituents towards these incestuous elites.’ 
This macro-level factor would lead us to different expectations for centre-left 
preferences in the struggle over corporate governance arrangements in at least 
two out of the three small, corporatist economies, which I propose to analyze 
here.  In  fact,  given  that  at  least  in  Sweden  and  the  Netherlands,  corporate 
governance regimes were not the creation of the right alone, but rather the result 
of cooperative relations between left and right, we would expect the left to be 
opposed to shareholder-orientated reforms of these arrangements for the same 
reasons that the centre-right opposes them in Cioffi and Höpner’s (2006) cases. 
 
The following sections retrace for each country case the recent debates about 
corporate  governance  reforms  in  order to  determine whether  these  processes 
were  characterized  by  a  ‘party  paradox’  or not.  In the  latter  case,  we  could 
conclude  that  the  micro-level  ‘push  factors’  for  labour  support  of  pro-
shareholder reform, were cancelled out by the macro-level ‘pull factors’. 
 
3. Method: Case Selection and Empirical Material 
This study compares the political decision-making processes on shareholder-
orientated corporate governance reforms with the view of analyzing the impact 
of different factors on centre-left policy preferences. More precisely, in order to 
further Cioffi and Höpner's analysis of the determinants of the party paradox, 
this  study  analyzes  the  impact  of  the  macro-level  explanation 
(inclusion/exclusion  of  the  left  from  the  definition  of  corporate  governance 
arrangements) on the outcome (centre-left support for pro-shareholder reforms). 
In  order  to  do  this,  case  studies  on  three  small,  corporatist,  and  'consensual 
democracies'  (Katzenstein,  1985;  Lijphart,  1999),  where  employer-labour 
relations are per definition collaborative rather than conflicting, are completed. 
While Cioffi and Höpner (2006a, pp. 15-16) point to the robustness of their 
findings given that their country sample (France, Germany, Italy, and the US) 
allows them to control for different party- and political systems (two-party vs. 
multi-party;  parliamentary  vs.  presidential),  different  varieties  of  capitalism 
(liberal vs. coordinated market economies) and to exclude majority-opposition 
dynamics as explanation for the party paradox, their case studies do not include 
any small, corporatist consensus democracy. 
 
The  choice  of  the  three  country  cases  –  Switzerland,  Sweden,  and  the 
Netherlands – is motivated by a ‘most similar systems design’ (MSSD) strategy 
(see Peters, 1998). Ideally, this type of research design allows one to compare 
cases, which are similar on all but one independent variable, so as to isolate the   5
impact of this variable on the variation of the dependent variable. Obviously, 
this ideal MSSD is hardly achievable in the reality of social sciences (see for the 
Swiss case in particular Fontana, Afonso, & Papadopoulos, 2008). Yet, despite 
some important political differences (Switzerland is the only federalist country 
and the only non-EU member of the three), the three countries can be considered 
to be ‘most similar’ concerning several central features and notably concerning 
their  economic  structure  (large  number  of  large  internationally-orientated 
MNCs)  and  the  existence  of  neo-corporatist  arrangements  (see  Katzenstein, 
1985). Moreover, concerning the central variables of the ‘party paradox’ thesis, 
one of the three cases – Switzerland – is, despite the consensual nature of its 
politics, a case of 'left exclusion' (as are Cioffi and Höpner's cases), and has 
experienced  centre-left  pro-shareholder  support.  The  two  other  cases,  on  the 
other  hand,  are  'left  inclusion'  cases  and  do  not  show  any  sign  of  a  ‘party 
paradox’ during the reforms of their corporate governance system. The three 
cases vary hence concerning the central independent as well as the dependent 
variable.  Conversely,  all  three  micro-level  independent  variables 
(codetermination,  shareholding  by  employees,  reducing  managerial  agency 
costs)  are  present  in  two  of  the  three  countries  and  Switzerland  only  lacks 
codetermination
1. It is therefore possible to isolate the impact of the macro-level 
variable on the dependent variable. 
 
Furthermore, the fact that Sweden and the Netherlands are both negative cases 
for the ‘party paradox’, but are different concerning centre-left political power 
(Sweden  being  the  paradigmatic  case  of  social  democratic  power,  and  the 
Netherlands a case of moderate to low social democratic power), permits to 
control  for  the  alternative  explanation  that  not  the  role  of  labour  in  the 
establishment of corporate governance systems, but simply its strength explains 
support for pro-shareholder reform or absence thereof. 
 
In order to test the accuracy of the ‘party paradox’ hypothesis in the three cases, 
the technique of ‘process tracing’ is used. This technique consists of retracing a 
given process based on an in-depth study of various sources to create ‘causal 
chains’ between the dependent variable and the explanatory factors (see George 
& Bennett, 2005). The tracing of the political process will allow me to establish 
the centre-left preferences in the three cases and to control for the influence of 
other potential explanations such as the presence or absence of codetermination 
and the political strength of the centre-left. 
 
In order to determine the preferences of the centre-left and centre-right parties in 
each case, comparisons are made across the political decision-making processes 
that  led  to  the  corporate  governance  reforms  of  the  1990s  and  early  2000s. 
These comparisons are based on the analysis of official documents and ‘grey   6
literature’ relative to the reform processes, such as correspondence, unpublished 
reports, notes, and the minutes of meetings of public authorities and private 
organisations.  Newspaper  articles  and  secondary  literature  complete  the 
information  where  relevant.  These  materials  have  been  collected  from  web 
pages of public authorities and private organisations in the three countries (such 
as government, parliament, trade unions, employers association, stock market 
authorities,  and  political  parties)  and  –  for  Switzerland  and  Sweden  –  in 
different  archives  (Swiss  Federal  Archives  in  Bern,  Archives  of  the  Swiss 
Parliament, Swedish Riksarchiv, Marieberg, and the Swedish Royal Library). 
 
4. Case Studies: Corporate Governance Reforms in Switzerland, Sweden, 
and the Netherlands 
The following sections retrace for each country case the recent debates about 
corporate  governance  reforms  in  order  to  determine  whether  minority 
shareholder protection (MSP), which is an indicator of increased shareholder-
orientation of national corporate governance systems, has perceptibly increased 




For most of the 20
th century, the Swiss corporate governance regime was clearly 
orientated towards the interests of corporate insiders: the legal framework was 
very  sparse,  managers  were  largely  isolated  from  market  forces  through  a 
variety of instruments of insider control, and external shareholders were badly 
protected. The control of insiders over the companies rested on the one hand on 
an  extensive  financial  autonomy  of  the  management  due  to  the  absence  of 
disclosure requirements and the possibility to legally create hidden reserves; and 
on the other hand on complex capital structures and the existence of a system of 
restricted  transferability  of  shares  called  Vinkulierung.  The  latter  instrument 
allowed the management to refuse buyers of registered shares the inscription in 
the stock ledger and to deny them thus the exercise of their voting rights. The 
charter could provide that the company can refuse a buyer of registered shares 
without  even  mentioning  a  reason  (art.  686  al.2  of  the  Swiss  Code  of 
Obligations of 1936; henceforth aCO). These instruments very largely isolated 
Swiss companies from (financial) market pressures and ultimately led to the 
famous ‘fortress of the Alps’ as which the Swiss CG system was often labelled 
by foreign observers (David et al. forthcoming).  However, during the 1990s – 
starting  with  the  Stock  Corporation  Law  reform  of  1991  –  very  significant 
reforms  have  taken  place,  which  increased  the  level  of  legal  minority 
shareholder protection (MSP) considerably. 
   7
The reforms of the 1990s were the result of a decades-long political process. In 
fact, the reform of the Stock Corporation Law of 1936, which was the main 
source for corporate governance rules in a very sparse legal framework, was 
already kicked-off in 1965. The reform aimed at improving the protection of 
minority  shareholders  notably  by  weakening  the  traditional  instruments  of 
insider control (Schnyder 2008). This reform goal was supported during the first 
decade of the reform mainly by civil servants from the Department of Justice. 
From  the  mid-1970s  onwards,  however,  the  social  democrats  and  the  trade 
unions started to support the reform goal as well. The emergence of centre-left 
support  for  pro-shareholder  reform  is  explained  by  the  fact  that  the  main 
political objective of the Swiss labour movement during the post-war years, the 
introduction of a German-style co-determination system, was dwarfed by the 
rejection in a popular vote of the lefts co-determination initiative in 1976. In the 
absence  of  any  possibility  to  influence  corporate  policies  from  within,  the 
centre-left – that is, the Social Democratic Party (SPS) and soon also the Greens 
–  supported  the  shareholder-orientated  reform  goal  and  increasing  outside 
control  over  firms  as  an  alternative  means  of  employee  influence  (Schnyder 
2008a). During the 1980s, when the reform proposal that had been elaborated in 
two consecutive expert committees was finally debated in the parliament, the 
centre-left support for pro-shareholder reform went very far. Some socialist MPs 
even explicitly supported hostile takeovers and the emergence of a market for 
corporate control, considering that ‘[...] some fresh wind does not do any harm 
to the boards of directors and the executive floors […]’ of Swiss companies 
(intervention of SPS MP Carl Miville in the Council of States (CoS); Official 
Bulletin (OB) CoS 1988: 485, my translation). 
 
From the early 1980s onwards, the Swiss case was hence characterized by the 
‘party paradox’, which Cioffi and Höpner (2006) observe in the countries of 
their sample. However, the centre-left parties’ position in Switzerland is weak. 
In the Swiss federal parliament, centre-left parties never controlled more than 
30% of the seats in the lower chamber of parliament (the National Council) (see 
Armingeon et al. 2005) and considerably less in the upper chamber, the Council 
of  States  (CoS).  Given  these  power  relations  and  that  all  major  centre-right 
parties (the Free Democrats, the Christian-Democrats and the Swiss People’s 
Party)  were  during  the  early  1980s  strongly  opposed  to  the  objective  of 
weakening insider control, the National Council (NC), the lower chamber of 
parliament,  which  debated  the  reform  from  1983  to  1985,  reoriented  the 
moderately pro-shareholder governmental reform proposal from 1982 towards 
the interests of corporate insiders. By the mid 1980s, the new proposal was 
according to several observers even more favourable to insiders than the law of 
1936 (see e.g. SPS MP François Borel BO NC 1985: 1667). 
   8
However, during the late 1980s a very remarkable change set in: The CoS – 
where the left (including the Alliance of Independents) held during this period 
only  6  out  of  46  seats  –  reintroduced  several  reform-postulates  of  the 
governmental  proposal  and  re-orientated  the  law  in  favour  of  minority 
shareholders.  The  chairman  of  the  preparatory  committee  of  the  Council  of 
States – the Christian Democrat Carlo Schmid – explicitly stated that the upper 
chamber ‘[…] wanted to lay the stress more on the protection of the shareholder 
than the National Council […]’ (OB CoS 1988: 455, my translation). Given that 
the same centre-right parties dominated the Council of States and the National 
Council,  this  remarkable  change  can  only  be  explained  by  a  change  in  the 
centre-right parties’ preferences. 
 
Due to this turnabout, the new stock corporation law that was finally adopted in 
1991 protected minority shareholders much better than the law of 1936 (Kunz 
2001: 246). Thus, it limits considerably the use of Vinkulierung in the case of 
listed  shares  and  introduced  new  shareholder  rights  in  order  to  control 
management. This trend towards increasing shareholder orientation continued 
during the 1990s notably with the adoption of the first Stock Exchange and 
Securities Trading Act (SESTA) at the federal level in 1995, which introduced a 
mandatory bid rule and constitutes the legal basis for the listing requirements of 
the newly formed Swiss Stock Exchange SWX. The new listing requirements 
introduced  far-reaching  changes,  as  for  instance  the  ‘true  and  fair’  view 
principle  in  accounting,  which  would  have  been  unthinkable  only  ten  years 
previous (Hirsch 1995: 230). 
 
In short, in Switzerland, the left supported pro-shareholder reform due to its 
weak  position  within  the  firm.  However,  the  ultimate  explanatory  factor  for 
reforms  was  an  increasing  support  of  centre-right  MPs  for  shareholder-
orientated  reforms,  which  led  to  a  broad  cross-class  pro-reform  coalition 
including both centre-left and centre-right parties. As I will show in the next 
section, the patterns of change were very different in the Swedish case. 
 
4.2 Sweden 
Like the Swiss system, the Swedish system of CG was during most of the 20
th 
century  clearly  insider-orientated  and  minority  shareholder  interests  were 
subordinated  to  other  interests.  A  major  difference  between  Switzerland  and 
Sweden, however, concerns the position of labour within the firm and more 
precisely  the  existence  in  Sweden  of  mechanisms  of  board-level  co-
determination. In fact, since 1977, Swedish employees have the right to appoint 
– depending on the size of the company – two or three representatives to the 
one-tire board of directors. 
   9
Insider-control in Sweden was mainly based on the instruments of voting right 
distortions  and  stock  pyramids,  which  had  their  legal  source  in  the  stock 
corporation law (Aktiebolagslag; ABL) and allowed a very limited number of 
owner families and other traditional shareholders to control ‘their’ companies. 
Due  to  these  instruments  –  and  to  a  conscious  governmental  tax  policy 
favouring large firms owned by a limited number of ‘capitalists’ – Sweden had 
probably one of the most concentrated control structures world-wide and the 
most powerful blockholders (see e.g. Högfeldt 2005, Henrekson & Jakobsson 
2001). 
 
The most recent reform of the ABL was kicked off by the SAP government of 
PM Ingvar Carlsson who established in 1990 an Aktiebolagskommitté (Stock 
Corporation Committee) mainly in order to adapt the ABL of 1975 to EC law in 
view of Sweden’s accession to the EU in 1995. A second aspect of the reform – 
however – was explicitly to improve the protection of minority shareholders 
(see governmental directive dir. 1990:46). The reform led quickly to different 
changes in the Swedish ABL, which adapted Swedish law to the EC company 
law directives and increased MSP somewhat. Most importantly, ‘bound shares’, 
through  which  foreigners  could  be  excluded  from  Swedish  companies,  were 
abolished in 1993 as they were incompatible with the EU’s anti-discrimination 
principle (see governmental reform proposal 1992/93:68). 
 
However,  beyond  EU  harmonisation,  the  debate  about  minority  shareholder 
rights and about shareholder primacy went less far than in Switzerland. The 
Stock Corporation Committee did stress the fact that owner interests were at the 
centre  of  the  reform.  However,  the  idea  of  shareholder-orientation  was 
interpreted in a completely different way than in most other European countries 
where Anglo-Saxon ideas of shareholder primacy gained increasing prominence 
during  the  1990s.  In  accordance  with  the  traditional  Swedish  conception  of 
ownership  (see  Henrekson  &  Jakobsson  2001),  shareholder  orientation  was 
interpreted as enhancing the means of large shareholders to actively influence 
and monitor the companies’ activities. The Swedish legislator coined the term 
‘active  ownership’  for  this  specific  Swedish  variation  on  the  Anglo-Saxon 
shareholder primacy theme. Thus, the AB Committee stressed the ‘importance 
of  an  active  ownership  role’  (SOU  1995:44,  p.19;  my  translation)  and  that 
‘[s]hareholders  who  take  responsibility  for  the  corporate  and  business 
development are […] an important element in a prosperous market economy’ 
(see the official report on ‘The Organisation of the Stock Corporation’; SOU 
1995:44  p.154;  my  translation).  Rather  than  leading  to  increasing  MSP,  this 
approach was the rationale for the rejection of different reform claims – mainly 
stemming  from  foreign  investors  and  the  lobby  of  small  shareholders 
Aktiesparernas Riksförbund – to abolish voting right distortions and to introduce   10 
a mandatory bid rule. The Committee argued that voting right distortions would 
guarantee that even in large companies, blockholders could play an active role 
in corporate governance, which was in the interest of the Swedish economy as a 
whole.  The  introduction  of  a  mandatory  bid  rule  was  rejected  on  the  same 
grounds, as it would make it more difficult for large shareholders to acquire a 
strong  position  within  a  firm  (see  e.g.  SOU  1997:22,  p.40).  This  view  was 
explicitly  supported  by  the  successive  governments  –  both  centre-right  and 
social democratic – and the legislator during the 1990s. In fact, despite several 
changes in governmental power during the reform process, these changes did 
not give rise to any perceptible change in the direction of the reforms as the 
‘party paradox’ thesis would have it. 
 
Ultimately, the new ABL was adopted by the Riksdag – Sweden’s unicameral 
parliament – in 2005 in an atmosphere of astonishing consensus. During the 
debates about the final version of the new law, MPs from both the centre-right 
Alliance for Sweden and the then governing SAP expressed the broad consensus 
that  prevailed  during  the  reform  process  (see  notably  intervention  of  Bertil 
Kjellberg  (moderaterna)  and  Johan  Löfstrand  (SAP)  in  the  debates  in  the 
Riksdag on June 13, 2005).
2 
 
As a result of this broad consensus that no fundamental change in the Swedish 
conception  of  ownership  was  desirable,  the  law  brought  only  very  limited 
increase  in  MSP  (ECGS  2007).  Most  importantly  none  of  the  traditional 
instruments of insiders control were weakened: thus, voting right distortions and 
share pyramids were not touched by the reform, and different instruments for 
limiting the transferability of shares were even reinforced. Concerning the latter, 
the AB Committee even prised the reinforcement of certain ‘reservations’ to the 
transfer of shares as a major achievement of the reform (SOU 2001:1, p.26). 
This clearly contrasts with the Swiss case, where shareholder rights increased 
considerably and instruments of insider control were limited already during the 
early 1990s. 
 
Sweden contradicts hence Cioffi and Höpner’s (2006) analysis in two ways: 
firstly, party politics did not play a role in CG reform. In fact, since both centre-
right  and  centre-left  parties  were  against  minority  shareholder-orientated 
reforms, it did not matter for the direction of the reform who actually governed. 
Both SAP- and bourgeois-dominated governments largely aimed at maintaining 
the  traditional  system  in  place  although  some  concessions  had  to  be  made 
notably due to EU membership. Secondly, the Swedish social democrats and 
trade unions did not support increasing outsider control over firms in order to 
reduce the power of insiders (mangers and blockholders). As an example, when 
a draft of the EU takeover directive, which threatened to outlaw in certain cases   11 
the  use  of  super-voting  shares  in  cases  of  takeovers,  was  tabled  in  winter 
2001/2002, the social democratic Persson government sided with the Swedish 
owner families in order to defend voting right distortions against EU legislation 
(Reiter 2003: 118). Sweden was hence clearly a case where an insider-outsider 
conflict, not a conflict over managerial control, prevailed. 
 
4.3 The Netherlands 
While the Swedish CG system can be seen as an extreme case of blockholder-
control where a large number of control enhancing mechanisms (CEM) increase 
the  influence  of  certain  large  shareholders,  the  Dutch  system  constitutes  an 
extreme case of managerial control, which is not so much based on increasing 
the influence of large owners, but much more on instruments that completely 
separate  control  from  ownership  (see  Moerland  2002).  This  has  led  to  the 
emergence  of  a  powerful  economic  elite,  composed  of  managers  and 
supervisory board members, which are linked through numerous interlocking 
directorates – both between supervisory and management boards – and were 
therefore  often  considered  to  form  an  impenetrable  ‘old  boys  network’  (see 
Fennema & Heemskerk 2008). No notable blockholders existed in most Dutch 
companies  as  ownership  is  rather  dispersed  (La  Porta  et  al.  1998)  and  the 
influence of owners was very limited. While a wide variety of CEM and of anti-
takeover  defences  existed,  the  two  main  instruments  of  insider  control  were 
probably the so-called ‘administration offices’ (administratiekantoor) and the 
particular  board  structure  established  under  the  ‘structure  regime’ 
(structuurregeling). 
 
The ‘administration office’ is a foundation, which holds a company’s shares or 
large parts of it and issues depositary certificates that carry the economic – but 
not  to  the  associational  –  rights  appending  to  the  shares  (Meinema  2002). 
Formally, the administration office exercises the voting rights in the interest of 
both the certificate holders and the company itself. However, as the boards of 
administration offices are ‘[…] typically populated by (former) directors of the 
firm whose shares the trust office keeps [...]’ (Heemskerk 2007: 56), they were 
clearly an instrument of insider control. 
 
The ‘structure regime’, on the other hand, was introduced in 1971 and aimed at 
balancing the major stakeholders’ interests for the benefit of the company as a 
whole.  Under  the  structure  regime  –  which  was  compulsory  for  most  large 
companies
3 – a two-tire board had to be established separating the management 
board  (raad  van  bestuur)  from  the  supervisory  board  (raad  van 
commissarissen). The latter board occupied a very powerful position as it had 
prerogatives that are in most countries among the shareholder meeting’s most 
fundamental powers. These include the election of the management board, the   12 
acceptance  of  the  annual  accounts  and  –  probably  most  importantly  –  the 
election of the supervisory board members themselves in a system of ‘controlled 
cooptation’ (Moerland 2002). The shareholder meeting – the third compulsory 
organ under the structure regime – on the other hand had only very limited 
powers.  In  particular,  even  when  acquiring  a  majority  stake  of  a  structure 
company’s equity, an investor could not influence much the composition of the 
supervisory  or  the  management  board,  which  is  why  the  structure  regime 
constituted an efficient anti-takeover device. 
 
The  fourth  organ  of  a  ‘structure  company’  was  the  works  council 
(ondernemingsraad),  which  had  several  strong  control  rights  over  the 
management  of  the  firm.  Thus,  the  works  council  had  to  be  consulted 
concerning certain important questions and had the right to block managerial 
decisions during one month by appealing to the Amsterdam Court of Appeal 
(Heemskerk 2007: 53). 
 
Significant pressure for corporate governance reform came in the Netherlands 
mainly from the stock exchange authorities (Vereniging voor de Effectenhandel, 
VEH),  which  started  already  in  the  mid-1980s  to  push  listed  companies  to 
abolish takeover defences. These claims were strongly opposed, however, by the 
listed companies who established in 1988 an association of listed companies 
(the  Vereniging  Effecten  Uitgevende  Ondernemingen,  VEUO)  in  order  to 
oppose  the  VEH’s  claims  (de  Jong  2001:  164).  The  opposition  between  the 
listed  companies  and  the  stock  exchange  authorities  led  eventually  to  the 
establishment  in  1995  of  a  provisional  takeover  panel  that  could  suspend 
takeover defences if a shareholder held more than 70% of the equity for at least 
12 months (de Jong 2001: 164). However, as no permanent solution could be 
found,  a  corporate  governance  committee  –  the  Peters  Committee  –  was 
established and published in 1997 a report containing forty recommendations 
for  good  practice  in  corporate  governance.  These  recommendations  were, 
however, largely ignored by listed companies (de Jong et al. 2005, Timmerman 
and Doorman 2002). Following up on the Peters Code, a new state-sponsored 
corporate  governance  committee  –  the  Tabaksblat  Committee  –  elaborated  a 
new code, which entered into force on January 1, 2004. This code has been 
implemented to a larger extent than the Peter’s Code (Akkermans et al. 2007), 
notably because second Balkenende government – uniting the major centre-right 
parties  Christian-Democratic  Appeal  (CDA),  the  liberal  People’s  Party  for 
Democracy  (VVD),  and  the  progressive  liberal  D66  –  decided  that  the  new 
Code should obtain a legal basis by integrating a ‘comply or explain’ rule in the 
reform of the ‘structure regime’. 
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This latter reform had been initiated in 2000 by Prime Minister Wim Kok’s 
'purple  government'
4  that  sought  advice  from  the  tripartite  Social  Economic 
Council (Sociaal-Economische Raad, SER) on reforms to the ‘structure regime’. 
This led the SER to publish in 2001 a very influential report (SER 2001), which 
proposed  to  increase  –  moderately  –  the  influence  of  both  shareholders  and 
employees on the firms (Timmerman & Doorman 2002). 
 
The ensuing reform, which was adopted by the Second Chamber of the Dutch 
parliament in September 2003 and by the First Chamber in July 2004, increased 
the  protection  of  shareholder  rights  considerably.  Thus,  for  ‘structure 
companies’, the cooptation procedure has been abolished and the members of 
the  supervisory  board  are  now  elected  by  the  AGM  on  proposal  by  the 
supervisory board. The annual accounts as well as the executive compensation 
policy are now approved by the AGM. Moreover, certificate holders can now 
demand the administration office that the votes linked to the shares for which 
they hold certificates be cast according to their instructions. Important decisions 
– such as the conclusion of joint ventures – have to be approve by the AGM as 
well (Groenewald 2005). 
 
However, despite a certain increase in MSP, the Dutch reform of 2004 does not 
constitute a break with the traditionally very pronounced stakeholder approach 
and was not as clearly orientated towards shareholder interests as the reforms in 
Switzerland  during  the  1990s.  The  resilience  of  the  stakeholder  approach  is 
expressed in the fact that the reform of the structure regime in the Netherlands 
increased  MSP  mainly  at  the  expense  of  the  supervisory  board  and  of  the 
management  board,  while  employees  and  their  representatives  have  rather 
gained  in  influence  alongside  shareholders.  Thus,  the  works  councils  have 




The centre-left’s support for the largely pro-shareholder reform can therefore be 
explained  by  the  fact  that  the existing system  was not  fundamentally  put  in 
question  and  labour  even  obtained  side-payments  in  the  form  of  increasing 
works council influence on board elections.  Yet, given that the reform of 2004 
took place under the CdA-led second Balkenende government, changes were 
possible only with centre-right support. The reason for the increasing reform 
will among centre-right parties, lies in the particular context of the early 21
st 
century.  In  fact,  contrary  to  Switzerland,  where  the  corporate  governance 
reforms  took  place  during  a  period  of  increasing  admiration  for  the  US’ 
economic dynamism (cf. the debate about the ‘New Economy’), debates in the 
Netherlands  were  very  much  marked  by  the  general  suspicion  against  the 
corporate  elite  in  the  ‘post-Dot-com  Bubble’  and  ‘post-Enron’  era.  The   14 
accounting  scandal  at  Dutch  multinational  Royal  Ahold  N.V.  and  at  Royal 
Dutch/Shell,  which  became  public  in  February  2002  and  in  January  2004 
respectively,  led  to  a  widely-shared  view  that  the  Dutch  system  too  lacked 
important ‘checks and balances’. During the debates in the Parliament members 
of parties from the right and from the left cited Ahold to show the need to 
increase the control over the supervisory and management boards. Thus, when 
the lower house of parliament voted on September 9, 2003 on the new law, only 
the  –  at  the  time  small  –  left-wing  Socialist  Party  (SP)  rejected  the  reform 
proposal. The major parties agreed hence on the need to limit the power of the 
‘old boys’ and to introduce appropriate ‘checks and balances’. 
 
Yet, neither centre-left nor centre-right saw the solution to this problem in an 
unconditional increase in shareholder power. The governing CdA rejected the 
abolishing of anti-takeover devices and considered hostile takeovers not as a 
control mechanism, but as a danger for the economy (see explicitly Rob van de 
Beete (CdA), minutes of the first Chamber of parliament EK 38 38-2071). The 
oppositional social-democratic Partij van de Arbeid (PdvA) explicitly supported 
this goal. In the First Chamber of parliament MP Ing Yoe Tan (PvdA) backed 
the second Balkenende government’s idea to maintain in principle the two-tire 
board system and the existing of anti-takeover devices, underscoring explicitly 
the limits of a shareholder-orientated Anglo-Saxon model (Session of July 6, 
2004;  EK  38  38-2067).  Takeover  devices  are  indeed  fiercely  and  largely 
successfully defended by the Dutch managerial elite with support of both the 
centre-right CdA and – less enthusiastically and more opportunistically – the 
PvdA (Culpepper forthcoming, chapter 4). 
 
Rather  than  from  market  forces  and  shareholders,  the  necessary  increase  in 
control over corporate insiders should therefore – like in the traditional system – 
come  from  a  balance  between  different  organs  of  the  stock  corporation 
representing different stakeholder groups. Both the governing centre-right and 
the oppositional PvdA, agreed that the system needed a certain re-balancing of 
powers in favour of the AGM, but – as a counter power – the position of the 
works councils should be strengthened as well. 
 
This consensus explains why such a central instrument of insider control as the 
cooptation  procedure,  could  be  abolished  without  the  existence  a  ‘party 
paradox’ and without disrupting the traditional ‘corporatist coalition’.
6 Like in 
Sweden, however, no major political force – except for the liberal VVD who 
asked  for  the  abolishing  of  the  structure  regime  (see  intervention  Ankie 
Broekers-Knol, EK 38 38-2069) – supported further liberalisation steps – such 
as  abolishing  anti-takeover  measures  –,  as  they  were  considered  to  give 






5. Analysis: What Explains the Party Paradox? 
The three country studies show patterns of corporate governance reform, which 
are substantially different from the cases that Cioffi and Höpner (2006) have 
analyzed. Switzerland experienced early on a ‘party paradox’ similar to Cioffi 
and Höpner’s (2006) cases. However, the factor which ultimately made legal 
change possible was substantial centre-right support for pro-shareholder reform. 
This finding does not fit in with their explanatory framework as both managerial 
elite and centre-right parties would be expected to oppose control-enhancing 
reforms. 
 
Sweden and the Netherlands on the other hand are different from Switzerland 
and the cases analyzed by Cioffi and Höpner (2006) in that they do not show 
any sign of a ‘party paradox’. Rather, they seem to be a case of surprisingly 
stable ‘corporatist’ coalitions, which defended largely the central elements of 
the traditional insider-orientated arrangements against external pressures. 
 
The question becomes hence, why do certain countries have a party paradox 
while others do not? And why does Switzerland seem to be one of the only 
countries  where  important  parts  of  centre-right  parties  supported  pro-
shareholder reforms? 
 
5.1 Centre-Left Preferences 
Concerning  the  first  question,  the  explanandum  is  the  absence  of  centre-left 
support for pro-shareholder reform in Sweden and the Netherlands. Given that 
all micro-level explanatory factors for the ‘party paradox’ put forward by Cioffi 
and  Höpner  (2006)  were  present  in  Sweden  and  the  Netherlands  as  well 
(employers  are  increasingly  shareholders  (see  Gourevitch  &  Shinn  2005  for 
figures),  they  are  interested  in  reducing  managerial  agency  costs,  and  they 
would gain from increasing board power over management as some form of 
codetermination exists), we need to look for alternative determinants of centre-
left and labour preferences. The reason why the Swedish and Dutch left did not 
support such reforms lies in another crucial determinant of centre-left parties’ 
preferences, whose importance Cioffi and Höpner (2006) underestimate, i.e. the 
type of relations that exist between employers and employees organisations and 
the  role  that  labour  played  in  the  emergence  of  the  corporate  governance 
regimes in these countries. Cioffi and Höpner’s (2006: 487) above-mentioned 
observation that corporate governance regimes were established by the right and   16 
benefited  mainly  conservative  parties,  can  be  extended  to  the  Swedish  and 
Dutch labour movements: the political economic institutions of the post-war era 
in  Sweden  and  the  Netherlands  –  but  not  in  Switzerland  –  were  created  in 
cooperation between labour and employers rather than under the exclusion of 
the  left.  Therefore,  it  comes  as  no  surprise  that  the  left  did  not  favour  the 
dismantling of these institutions. 
 
In Sweden, the SAP governed without interruption from 1936 to 1976 and left-
wing parties (including SAP, the Greens, and communists) never obtained less 
then 60% of the seats in parliament during the post-war period (Armingeon et 
al.  2005).  This  political  dominance  of  the  left  has  led  to  a  situation  where 
corporate governance structures emerged largely in the shadow of the socialist 
state. These arrangements were therefore clearly favourable to employees, or at 
least emerged with the consent of the SAP and trade unions. In fact, while the 
socialists agreed in a ‘historical compromise’ (Korpi 1982) to tolerate private 
property and leave the management of the firms largely to the ‘capitalists’ in 
exchange for a developed welfare state and active labour market policies, they 
had the power to impose legal rules favourable to employees whenever self-
regulation was unsatisfactory (see Högfeldt 2005). This was increasingly the 
cases  during  the  1970,  when  relations  between  employees’  and  employers’ 
organisation  became  more  confrontational  and  public  regulations  of  the 
economy and of industrial relations increased (Blyth 2002). As a result, the SAP 
did not have the same incentives as social democratic parties in other countries 
to  reform  this  system  and  explicitly  excluded  the  question  of  corporate 
governance – and notably the question of voting right distortions – from its 
reform and liberalisation program of the late 1980s (Reiter 2003: 104). 
 
In  the  Netherlands  too,  the  position  of  labour  in  the  post-war  corporate 
governance system created incentives for them to stick to this system. Dutch 
workers  obtained  during  the  post-war  period  a  powerful  position  in  the 
company. In particular, the establishment of works councils with considerable 
powers made of labour a more influential stakeholder group than the dispersed 
shareholders,  which  creates  incentives  for  managers  to  form  coalitions  with 
labour rather than with investors (see Poutsma & Braam 2005). 
 
Furthermore,  in  Sweden  and  the  Netherlands,  the  emergence  of  corporate 
governance structures that are favourable to employees was not so much the 
result  of  a  confrontational  process,  but  rather  of  a  long-term  cooperation 
between different stakeholders. In Switzerland, the only case analyzed here with 
a ‘party paradox’, on the other hand, the left was weak and its relations with the 
employers more confrontational or at least more uneven. 
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The history of co-determination in the three cases illustrates this fundamental 
difference. In Switzerland, the trade unions attempt to introduce a German-style 
codetermination  system  was  an  extremely  conflict-laden  process,  which 
culminated in a very aggressive campaign in the run up to the popular vote on 
the introduction of such a system. During the campaign, employers associations 
accused the left to attempt a ‘Bolshevisation’ of the Swiss economy (David et 
al. forthcoming). Due to the limited support of the left among Swiss voters, the 
centre-right opposition to codetermination could not be overcome and no board-
level co-determination system was introduced. 
 
In Sweden as well as in the Netherlands, in contrast, codetermination can rather 
be interpreted as a reward for restraint in wage demands during the post-war 
boom years, which did not generate much opposition by employers (see for the 
Dutch case de Jong & Röell 2005; for the Swedish case Högfeldt 2005). This 
interpretation  is  confirmed  by  a  look  at  the  political  power  relations:  in  the 
Netherlands, left parties’ political power was by no means sufficient to push-
through  the  introduction  of  a  codetermination  system  in  the  political  arena 
against to opposition of the centre-right parties. Thus during the post-war years, 
only between 1973 and 1977 was a clearly centre-left dominated government in 
place (Armingeon et al. 2005). When the ‘structure regime’ was introduced in 
1971, which conferred considerable powers to the works councils, the centre-
right Biesheuvel government was in place. 
 
In Sweden, codetermination arrangements were obviously mainly favoured by 
the umbrella organisation of trade unions (the Landsorganisationen, LO), but 
introduced in 1977 under the Fälldin Government, that is, the first centre-right 
government since 1936. Clearly, then, co-determination in the Netherlands and 
in  Sweden  was  not  primarily  the  result  of  political  power  relations,  but  of 
cooperative relations between labour and employers. 
 
These  particular  relations  between  labour  and  employers  in  Sweden  and  the 
Netherlands, which could be qualified as ‘corporatist’, are therefore a crucial 
factor that explains why the centre-left in the two countries did not support pro-
shareholder  reform.  This  difference  holds  not  only  in  comparison  with 
Switzerland, but also with the countries analyzed by Cioffi and Höpner (2006). 
In fact, even in Germany, which has a system of strong codetermination, this 
system was the result not of cooperation but of very contentious process and 
codetermination  ultimately  served  to  appease  a  strong  and  combative  labour 
movement.  Thus  the  ‘Montan  codetermination’  was  introduced  in  the  metal 
industry in 1951 following the threat of strikes by metalworkers unions and 
pressure  by  the  Allied  occupation  powers,  and  the  consolidation  of   18 
codetermination in 1972 under the social-democratic Brandt government was a 
highly contested process (Jackson 2005: 243). 
 
5.2 Centre-Right Preferences 
The question remains why Switzerland appears to be the only country where 
important parts of the centre-right parties favoured pro-shareholder reforms. I 
show in this section, in a rather exploratory fashion, that the fundamental reason 
for this was an increasing convergence of interests between important parts of 
the Swiss managerial elite and outside investors. This finding contradicts both 
agency theory – which is based on the assumption of a universal insider-outsider 
conflict – and Cioffi and Höpner’s (2006) findings that stress the persistence of 
a conflict over managerial control. This convergence of interests can be mainly 
explained by important changes in Swiss companies’ practices starting in the 
mid 1980s. 
 
The first companies to change their practices were the major Swiss banks, which 
underwent a strategic reorientation of consequence starting in the early 1980s. 
Due  to  increasing  domestic  competition  for  private  household  savings  with 
insurance companies, which started to offer attractive life insurance products, 
and due to the liberalisation of international financial markets, Swiss banks’ 
profit  margins  came  under  pressure.  They  started  hence  to  reorient  their 
strategies  towards  more  profitable  activities  such  as  asset  management  and 
investment  banking  (Ravara  1989,  Schaub  1992).  Due  to  this  reorientation, 
functioning capital markets became increasingly important for Swiss banks and 
they started early on to put pressure on the legislator to reform the financial and 
corporate governance systems (Schnyder 2008). The banking sector’s increasing 
focus  on  well-functioning  financial  markets  directly  affected  the  traditional 
corporate governance system. This concerned first and foremost the procedure 
of Vinkulierung, which clearly hampered the development of financial markets 
as it reduced liquidity. The banks’ support for this central pillar of the traditional 
Swiss system had been essential. In fact, since 1961, banks had formally agreed 
in  a  gentlemen’s  agreement  with  non-financial  companies  to  refuse  selling 
registered  stock  to  investors  who  did  not  fulfil  a  company’s  criteria  for 
registration  in  the  stock  ledger.  During  the  late  1980s,  the  Swiss  Bankers 
Association was increasingly critical towards this practice and started to ignore 
the  GA,  urging  at  the  same  time  companies  to  liberalize  their  practices  of 
Vinkulierung (Schnyder 2008). 
 
At first, this change in banks’ preferences created a situation of considerable 
tensions between banks and non financial companies, which was labelled by one 
MP as a ‘combat of the titans’ (Minutes of the preparatory committee of the 
CoS 1988: 483). Soon, however, the largest listed companies followed a similar   19 
change in preferences like the banking sector. Since the end of the 1980s, due to 
increasing liberalisation of product and financial markets but also due to the 
emergence in Switzerland of a hostile takeover threat by domestic ‘corporate 
raiders’, even non financial companies adopted increasingly investor-friendly 
corporate governance practices. 
 
These changes included the simplification of complex capital structures and the 
application  of  international  accounting  standards.  Thus,  while  in  1990  only 
14.8%  of  all  listed  companies  had  a  capital  structure  with  a  single  share 
category and hence no differential voting rights, by 2001 70.7% of the listed 
companies  in  Switzerland  had  introduced  the  ‘unitary  share’  (Einheitsaktie), 
which guaranteed that all shareholders were treated equally (Kunz 2002: 30). 
Furthermore, a clear majority (61.3%) of the companies that had introduced – 
by November 2000 – the unitary share abolished at the same time the possibility 
of  Vinkulierung  (Burkhalter  2001).  These  changes  allowed  the  largest  Swiss 
companies to increase their attractiveness for investors and thus reduce their 
capital costs, but also to obtain a powerful takeover currency to finance their 
international expansion. 
 
In parallel, the Swiss managerial elite underwent a significant change in their 
sociological profile: managers with a background in finance and holding US-
style  MBA  degrees  increasingly  replaced  the  traditional  lawyer-manager  or 
engineer-manger (David et al. 2008, Davoine 2005). In addition, Höpner (2003) 
has argued for the German case, that managers became increasingly supportive 
of value-based management (VBM) methods because such methods implied a 
very significant increase in executive compensation due to stock option plans. 
The spread of stock option plans in Switzerland since the early 1990s makes a 
similar effect in Switzerland at least plausible. Both factors, contributed to an 
increasing popularity of the shareholder value idea and of the VBM approach 
and furthered, thus, the convergence of interests between managers and outside 
investors. This can be illustrated by the contributions in a publication by the 
influential Neue Zürcher Zeitung – close to the centre-right Free Democrats – 
entitled  ‘Shareholder  Value’  in  which  several  managers  of  large  Swiss 
companies explicitly defend the new shareholder primacy approach against the 
traditional ‘multi-referentiality’ of the company (NZZ 1996). 
 
These changes in corporate practices and in the managerial elite’s preferences 
explains  the  above-mentioned  increasing  centre-right  MPs  support  for 
shareholder-orientated reform,  which in turn explains why increases in MSP 
became  possible  during  the  early  1990s  despite  the  weakness  of  the  social 
democrats. 
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Yet, a similar convergence of interests has been observed in other countries too 
(see  Moore  &  Rebérioux  2007  for  the  US  and  UK  cases;  Höpner  2003  for 
Germany),  but  did  not  lead  –  at  least  in  the  US  and  Germany  –  to  any 
comparable centre-right support for such reforms. One reason for this can be 
seen in the fact that, in Switzerland, as a small country with a comparatively 
large  number  of  MNCs,  the  business  elite  and  centre-right  parties  are 
disproportionately  dominated  by  the  large  MNCs,  which  were  also  the 
companies  that  were  the  first  to  embrace  the  new  shareholder-orientated 
approach  to  management.  However,  this  would  lead  us  to  expect  a  similar 
evolution in Sweden and the Netherlands, as both are small countries with a 
large number of MNCs. Two factors explain why this did not happen: firstly, the 
means of insider-control over companies in Sweden and the Netherlands were 
very  different  from  Switzerland,  and  secondly  the  position  of  the  financial 
sector in the economy was different too. 
 
The Swedish model was different from the Swiss model, notably concerning the 
identity of insiders. In fact, blockholding owner families played a major role in 
the Swiss and the Swedish corporate governance system. Yet, the typical Swiss 
owner-family  did  not  hold  major  stakes  in  more  than  one  company,  but 
controlled often just the company that a member of the family had founded and 
in which they were – importantly – actively involved in the management (La 
Porta  et  al.  1998,  1999).  Therefore,  Switzerland  can  be  characterized  as  an 
‘entrepreneurial  blockholder  model’.  Accordingly,  the  owner-families’  stakes 
were often large enough to permit control even without many CEM. La Porta et 
al.’s  (1998)  concentration  index  of  the  three  largest  shareholders  in  the  10 
largest domestic non-financial, non state-owned companies in 1995 shows in 
fact an average concentration of 41% for Switzerland. 
 
The Swedish economy, on the other hand, is organized into different ‘spheres’ 
of influence in which a very limited number of individuals and families played a 
major  role  (Collin  1998,  Carlsson  2007).  CEM  such  as  Stock  pyramids  and 
voting  right  distortions  played  a  major  role  in  these  spheres  of  influence  as 
capital  ownership  was  not  particularly  concentrated.  The  above-mentioned 
LLSV concentration index for Sweden is 28%, which is well below the Swiss 
average. The control of voting rights, however, was probably more concentrated 
in  Sweden  than  in  any  other  advanced  economy.  Thus,  the  Wallenberg 
foundation which controlled at the end of 1998 – directly and indirectly – about 
42% of total market capitalisation of the SSE, held only 1% in terms of capital 
(Henrekson  and  Jakobsson  2006:  27-28).  The  typical  Swedish  owner-family 
controls hence a larger number of firms with less capital. This situation made 
that  CEM  were  more  important  to  exercise  control  and  that  the  traditional 
system was very vulnerable to liberalisation (Henrekson & Jakobsson 2006).   21 
The  importance  of  CEM  for  the  traditional  blockholders  to  maintain  their 
control  explains  largely  the  strong  opposition  of  the  business  elite  towards 
change.  There  is  indeed  little  evidence  for  changes  at  the  level  of  Swedish 
companies’ corporate governance practices during the 1990s. Thus, as late as 
2006, a clear majority (64%) of listed companies in Sweden have issued dual 
class shares with voting right distortions, which compares to less then 30% of 
listed companies in Switzerland (see for Sweden Henrekson & Jakobsson 2006: 
24,  table  9;  for  Switzerland  Kunz  2002:  31).  Also,  almost  50%  of  the  120 
Swedish companies, which went public during the period 1998 to 2002, still 
issued shares with differential voting rights (Veckans Affärer, April 7, 2003). 
 
In the Netherlands ownership was rather dispersed compared to Switzerland and 
anti-takeover devices and CEM were – like in Sweden – particularly important 
for the insiders to keep control. Thus, de Jong and Röell (2005: 482) find for 
1993 that only 10.4% of the 143 Dutch firms in their sample can be qualified as 
family-controlled  firms.  It  comes  hence  as  no  surprise  that  Dutch  insiders 
resisted  the  abolishing  of  insider  control  instrument  vehemently.  The 
establishment in 1989 of the VEUO in order to oppose the VEH’s claims for 
abolishing  anti-takeover  rules  (see  above)  is  a  very  telling  example,  which 
contrasts with the largest Swiss companies that started to liberalize from 1988 
onwards  –  without  legal  constraint  –  their  capital  structures  and  exposed 
themselves increasedly to a hostile takeover threat. As a result, like in Sweden, 
these  instruments  did  not  significantly  decline  in  the  Netherlands  until  very 
recently. A report by Deminor Rating shows that in 2005, 86% of the twenty-
one  Dutch  companies  in  their  sample  still  used  one  or  several  of  these 
instruments of minority control. Another study finds that as late as 2005, Dutch 
companies  were  considerably  more  protectionist  than  Swiss  and  even  than 
Swedish companies concerning the capital structure: 36% of the 47 largest listed 
companies still had more than one share class (Aggarwal et al 2007: 34, table 7). 
This compares to 2% (of a total of 58 companies analyzed) for Switzerland and 
30%  (43  companies  analyzed)  for  Sweden.  Furthermore,  whereas  hostile 
takeovers  had  become  a  relatively  common  phenomenon  in  Switzerland  and 
Sweden  by  the  end  of  the  1990s  (Schnyder  2008,  Henrekson  &  Jakobsson 
2006), only one single hostile takeover attempt on Dutch firms had succeeded 
between 1960s and the late 1990s (de Jong 2001: 160). Again the vulnerability 
of Dutch companies to liberalisation may explain – like in the Swedish case – 
largely why the managerial elite and the centre-right parties did not support pro-
shareholder reforms. 
 
A  second  central  factor  in  order  to  understand  the  coalitions  in  the  three 
countries concerns the role of the financial sector. In Switzerland, the financial 
sector is one of the most important branches of the economy. To give but one   22 
indicator  of  the  size  of  the  banking  sector,  the  proportion  of  assets  under 
management over GDP was 900% in Switzerland in 2005 (see SwissBanking 
2006: 15). This compares to 400% for the Netherlands and 120% for Sweden in 
2001 (Prast & van Lelyveld 2005: 323). Therefore, financial actors – and in 
particular the large banks and their peak organisation, the SBA – represented a 
very important part of the Swiss economy and constitute a considerable political 
force in their own right, which was not the case to the same extent in either 
Sweden or the Netherlands. 
 
The  Swedish  economy  is  dominated  by  two  main  business  groups  –  the 
Wallenberg  sphere  and  the  Handelsbank  group  –  in  each  of  which  a  bank 
occupies a central place (see notably Collin 1998). Yet, the banking sector did 
not become an important pro-reform actor like in Switzerland. This is explained 
by the fact that, despite their central position in the economy, the major Swedish 
banks  were  closely  controlled  by  a  particular  type  of  owners.  Thus,  the 
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken (SEB) is controlled by the Wallenberg family 
and  the  Handelsbanken  by  individuals  close  to  its  management.  This 
distinguishes them from Swiss banks. In the Swiss case all three major banks 
(UBS,  CS,  and  SBS)  were  for  most  of  their  recent  history  widely-held 
companies without any shareholder controlling significant stakes over longer 
periods.  This  has  important  implications  for  the  banking  sector’s  role  in 
corporate governance reform: Swedish banks are closely interwoven in spheres 
of influence in which financial interests did not prime over industrial interests. 
Also, their strategic choices were during long time heavily limited by public 
regulations (Englund 1999). Rather than being independent economic actors, 
which also constitute a powerful political actor, Swedish banks were largely a 
means for their owners to control non financial companies through pyramidal 
control structures. These owners valued industrial interests at least as much as 
financial  interests  and  opposed  the  abolishing  of  traditional  instruments  of 
insider  control,  such  as  voting  right  distortions,  on  which  their  control  was 
based. Therefore, the banking sector was not the vector for the financialisation 
of the economy that it was in Switzerland. 
 
While the banking sector in the Netherlands, is much larger than in Sweden and 
hence  important  for  the  Dutch  economy  as  a  whole  (Prast  &  van  Lelyveld 
2005),  the  role  of  banks  was  very  different  from  Swiss  banks.  Historically, 
Dutch banks did not engage in long-term lending to industrial companies and 
attempts to establish a universal bank system akin to the German model failed 
(de Jong & Röell 2005). Dutch banks therefore never acquired an as central 
position in the economy as the major Swiss universal banks and did not develop 
as close relations with non-financial companies. Only after 1990, when legal 
restrictions  were  removed,  did  Dutch  banks  expand  their  activities  into  new   23 
sectors such as the insurance business (Heemskerk & Schnyder 2008). This led 
to the emergence of the large financial conglomerates ABN AMRO, ING and 
Fortis and to a considerable increase in the size of the Dutch banking sector. 
Thus, the assets under management by Dutch banks over GDP increased from 
less than 300% in 1997 to over 400% in 2001 (Prast & van Lelyveld 2005: 322). 
Yet, contrary to Swiss banks, Dutch banks’ strategies moved to a lesser extent 
away from the lending business. On the contrary, Dutch banks started to become 
active in the long term lending business only relatively recently – i.e. since the 
1960s – and they did not abandon this sector during the 1980s. Thus, in 1990, 
71.6% of Dutch banks’ income was interest income, while the same figure was 
only 51.2% for Swiss banks, indicating the greater importance that financial 
markets had for the latter. Still in 2000, the majority of Dutch banks’ income 
was interest income (53%), while in Switzerland the same figure was down to 
37.3% (Heemskerk & Schnyder 2008: 45). 
 
The less central position of Dutch banks in the economy and the fact that their 
income dependent to a lesser degree on financial market activities may explain 
why actors close to the banking sector did not play a similar pro-shareholder 
reform role as the Swiss banking sector. 
 
In short, the way in which ‘insiders’ exercise corporate control and the presence 
of  strong,  independent  banks  as  a  central  pro-reform  actor  explain  why 
Switzerland was the only one of the three countries where the pro-shareholder 
coalition was to a considerable extent support by the centre-right. 
 
6. Conclusion 
To sum up, the three cases, which I analysed in this paper, show diverse patterns 
of corporate governance reform as well concerning their outcome as concerning 
the political coalitions that formed around the issues of shareholder orientation. 
Switzerland experienced considerable increases in the legal level of minority 
shareholder protection already at the beginning of the 1990s. These reforms was 
supported by the centre-left parties for a long time, but became possible only 
when parts of the centre-right joined the pro-reform coalition. This happened 
during the late 1980s and the early 1990s when banks and the largest companies 
changed towards more investor-friendly corporate governance practices. 
 
In Sweden and the Netherlands, on the other hand, no comparable increase in 
legal MSP took place. In fact, legal reforms remained very marginal up until the 
early  2000s  and  even  then  did  the  changes  not  fundamentally  weaken  the 
traditional  insider-orientated  corporate  governance  system.  At  the  level  of 
politics, both cases are characterized by a stable coalition between centre-left   24 
and  centre-right  parties  who  defended  the  traditional  system  against  too  far-
reaching changes. 
 
Therefore, in none of the three cases did party politics play the role that we 
would expect based on Cioffi and Höpner’s (2006) study. In other words, the 
‘party paradox’ is by no means a universal phenomenon, but emerges only in 
certain circumstances. My study allows me to single out factors, which explain 
the presence or absence of a party paradox in the cases analyzed here and to 
complete,  thus,  the  emergent  theory  that  derives  from  Cioffi  and  Höpner’s 
(2006) analysis. More precisely, my analysis shows that neither the existence of 
co-determination arrangements, nor a general interest of employees to reduce 
managerial  agency  costs,  nor  the  part  of  employees’  pension  savings  that  is 
invested  in  corporate  stock  are  sufficient  explanations  for  the  left’s  pro-
shareholder  preferences.  Rather,  the  emergence  of  an  investor-employee 
coalition  depends  on  the  nature  of  relations  that  exist  between  labour  and 
employers and on the historical role that labour played in the creation of the 
national corporate governance system. 
 
Political  theories  of  corporate  governance  attribute  the  political  strength  of 
labour  an  important  explanatory  power  for  corporate  governance  structures. 
Thus,  Roe’s  (2003)  analysis  suggests  a  linear  relationship  where  increasing 
social  democratic  power  implies  increasing  ‘insider  characteristics’ 
(blockholding,  low  levels  of  MSP)  of  the  corporate  governance  regime. 
Conversely, Cioffi and Höpner’s (2006) study suggests that social democratic 
power is – in the context of the late 20
th century – associated with increasing 
shareholder-orientation. My study shows, in stead, a more complex relationship 
between  labour  strength  and  the  characteristics  of  the  corporate  governance 
system. In fact, one implication of my study is that centre-left preferences may 
vary in function of labour strength. Thus, in countries where labour is relatively 
strong, we can expect corporate governance arrangements to be more favourable 
to employees than in countries where labour is weak. Therefore, we can expect 
labour to be opposed to pro-shareholder reforms. In countries where labour is 
relatively weak, we can expect that corporate governance regimes are contrary 
to their interests and the centre-left will therefore favour such reforms. Roe’s 
(2003) and Cioffi and Höpner’s (2006) explanations are hence not necessarily 
contradictory,  but  may  describe  two  situations  that  may  emerge  in  different 
contexts. 
 
This also provides an alternative rationale for the correlation, which Roe (2003) 
finds between the strength of social democracies and ‘insider characteristics’. 
Looking  closely  at  the  political  process  of  corporate  governance  reforms 
suggests that the reason for this correlation may lie in the fact that in countries   25 
with a strong social democratic party the centre-left has no incentive to favour 
pro-shareholder reform. Therefore, in such countries outside investors may lack 
an essential political support for pro-shareholder reform, which in turn explains 
low levels of MSP and high levels of ownership concentration. In countries 
where social democrats are comparatively weak, on the other hand, they will 
favour  reforms  of  existing  corporate  governance  arrangements  that  are 
detrimental to their interests. Therefore, in such countries, an important political 
pro-reform  force  exists,  which  increases  the  likelihood  that  pro-shareholder 
reforms can be achieve in coalition with outside investors. 
 
However,  my  study  clearly  shows  that  the  preferences  of  centre-left  parties 
cannot be explained by their political strength alone. Even in countries where 
labour is politically relatively weak, it still may oppose reforms when relations 
with employers are cooperative. This was the case in the Netherlands where the 
centre-left was politically weaker than for instance in Germany (see Armingeon 
et al. 2005). Yet, the Dutch labour movement entertained cooperative relations 
with employers, which allowed them to contribute to a larger extent to corporate 
governance  arrangements  than  the  German  left.  Therefore,  the  nature  of  the 
relations between employers and employees organisations is a more important 
determinant of centre-left preferences than their political strength. 
 
Furthermore, the Swiss case shows that a shareholder-investor coalition may not 
be a sufficient condition for pro-shareholder reform in all cases and that there 
are different pathways towards shareholder orientation. In fact the centre-right is 
not invariably an obstructive force in the reform process of insider-orientated 
corporate  governance  regimes.  Under  certain  circumstances,  even  the 
managerial  elite  in  strongly  insider-orientated  corporate  governance  systems 
seems ready to support increasing shareholder-orientation. This appears to be 
the case notably in economies, which are dominated by a strong financial sector 
and by large multinational companies. Yet, the Swedish and Dutch cases also 
show  that  these  factors  alone  do  not  account  for  the  centre-right  parties’ 
preferences  either.  In  fact,  another  central  implication  of  my  study  is  the 
importance of acknowledging the variety within the group of insider-orientated 
systems and of addressing the question of ‘who are the insiders?’ in order to 
understand corporate governance reforms in different insider-orientated systems 
(see  for  a  similar  point  Culpepper  2007).  Insider-orientated  corporate 
governance systems can by no means be considered as a homogeneous group, 
which  has  profound  consequences  for  the  patterns  of  corporate  governance 
reform. Thus, the Netherlands is an insider-orientated, but not a blockholder 
system, and even the two blockholder systems of Switzerland and Sweden are 
very  different  concerning  the  identity  of  the  blockholders,  their  means  of 
control,  and  hence  their  preferences,  which  explains  different  patterns  of   26 
change. I have argued that the structure of the economy (strength of the financial 
sector) and the means of insider control (CEM or concentrated) ownership may 
be central factors explaining differences in centre-right preferences in the three 
cases  analysed  here.  Further  case  studies  of  different  countries’  reform 
trajectories  will  be  needed  to  in  order  to  generalise  these  findings  and  to 
ultimately build – starting from mid-range theories – a more accurate theory of 
the politics of corporate governance. 




1This does not constitute a problem however, since Cioffi and Höpner's cases 
show that codetermination is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for 
the  party  paradox.  Even  the  problem  of  'conjunctural  causation'  (see  Peters 
1998), i.e. that codetermination causes center-left support for pro-shareholder 
reform in interaction with another variable, can be excluded as Switzerland is a 
positive case of center-left shareholder support. 
2 The minutes of the session of June 13, 2005 are available at: 
http://www.riksdagen.se/Webbnav/index.aspx?nid=101&dok_id=GS09138&bet
=2004/05:138 
3 A ‘structure company’ (structuurvennootschap) is defined as a company that 
satisfies during three consecutive years the following criteria: i) issued share 
capital of at least € 13m (€ 16m since October 2004); ii) has more than 100 
employees,  and  iii)  falls  under  the  obligation  of  the  Works  Council  Act  to 
establish  a  works  council  (Meinema  2002:  158).  A  mixed  regime  could  be 
adopted by multinational companies, which employed only a minority of the 
work  force  in  the  Netherlands.  Also,  smaller  companies  could  opt  into  the 
system by including such a provision in the articles of incorporation. 
4 From 1994 to 2002 the Netherlands were governed by a coalition composed of 
the social-democratic PvdA (Partij van de Arbeid), the liberal VVD, and the 
progressive liberal D66. Due to the party colours of the social democrats (red) 
and the liberals (blue) this coalition was often called the ‘purple coalition’. 
5  It  should  be  noted  however  that  some  observers  did  fear  an  imbalanced 
increase in shareholder power at the expense of the works councils. This fear 
was related to the fact that while works councils obtained a right to appoint up 
to one-third of the supervisory board, but their right to object to the election of 
the rest of the members was abolished (Groenewald 2005). 
6 Culpepper (forthcoming) finds, however, that at least concerning the issue of 
anti-takeover defences, the Dutch case cannot be seen as a proper ‘corporatist 
coalition’,  as  the  opposition  to  liberalisation  was  mainly  due  to  successful 
managerial  lobbying  of  the  CdA,  while  the  PdvA  did  not  have  any  strong 
preferences concerning this issue and changed its attitude several times. Still, 
contrary to the ‘party paradox’ hypothesis, the social democrats were no active 
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